(1982). J. S. DREY EN F. SCHLEIERMACHER AAN HET BEGIN VAN DE FUNDAMENTELE THEOLOGIE OORSPRONGEN EN ONTWIKKELINGEN. Bijdragen: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 251-288.

I. Eth. Nic. III. c. I, § 16. In spite of what Bernays and others have done to clear up this chapter, many perplexities remain. To some of these I propose later to return, but here I confine myself to one. Among the possible circumstances of an act, ignorance of which is excusable and may excuse, is enumerated τò ο νεκα. Nothing but desperation could have led the commentators to suggest that here τò ο νεκα means the actual effect or (...) result of the act . It may be sufficient to quote the notes ad loc. of these two scholars: 1. Stewart: ‘The o νεκα here is not, as usual, the intention of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the outcome or result of what he actually does, which is the opposite of the intention.’. (shrink)

Solon's extraordinary claim, that we should call "no one happy who is still living", presents a fascinating and distinctive argument about happiness and the length of a human life. The issues Solon raises are important, and even if we think his pessimistic conclusion is an exaggeration we can still appreciate his central concern how conceptions of happiness and the length of a human life are connected. The purpose of this paper is to explore a few of these problems, in particular (...) the reason why Aristotle's reply to Solon in the Nicomachean Ethics is somewhat ambiguous. We find Aristotle addressing Solon's claim at the outset of Eth. Nic. A 10, troubled in one sense by its conclusion, yet struck by its partial truth. On the one hand, he thinks that requires a "complete life" or at the very least, a sufficient and "complete span of time", both of which are compatible with Solon's advice that we should postpone calling someone happy until a later point in life. But on the other hand Aristotle defines in such a way that raises the question whether he needs to accept Solon's claim in any form. In particular, if happiness is defined in terms of excellent activity as Aristotle repeatedly claims, why should we wait until a person dies to call him or her happy? Why shouldn't excellent actions, at the very time they are performed, count someone as happy? The puzzle, in short, is the fact that Aristotle defines happiness in terms of activities that are complete without developing over time, and yet also claims that happiness requires a "complete lifetime". (shrink)

Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show (...) that on various plausible interpretations of Revelation it is in fact consistent with physicalism. Moreover, there is a robust reading of Revelation that a posteriori physicalists can, and should, accept. (shrink)

For many, the paradigm of a deflationary theory of truth is the redundancy theory, which is typically taken to consist of two claims: namely (i) that sentences containing the truth predicate are synonymous with sentences not containing the truth predicate (and so the truth predicate is redundant) and (ii) that there is no property of truth.1 The redundancy theory is not an attractive theory of truth since neither of its claims is particularly plausible on its own, and the combination of (...) the two claims is, if not actually inconsistent, at least uncomfortable.2 Very few deflationists nowadays endorse either part of the theory. (shrink)

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, (...) for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal-explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one. (shrink)

In the last 30 years repeated attempts have been made to develop a proof-sketch Kripke gave for essentialism about material origins into a cogent argument. I argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed, and so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail.

The current study compared thought suppression, focused attention and unfocused attention as strategies for managing spider fear. Spider fearful participants were exposed to a strategy induction before completing a Behavioural Approach Test . The BAT is a 10 step measurement of how close participants are willing to move towards a spider. Participants were instructed to use what they learned in the pre-BAT induction to help them advance through the steps of the BAT. The results of the study indicated that participants (...) given the thought suppression or the unfocused attention induction moved through significantly less steps of the BAT than did those given the focused attention induction. Additionally, the thought suppression group felt significantly more anxious than the focused and unfocused attention groups following completion of the BAT. These results are discussed in terms of the impact of thought suppression on avoidance behaviour in phobias. (shrink)

Nic R. Jones ABSTRACT: The The lack of diversity in academic philosophy has been well documented. This paper examines the reasons for this issue, identifying two intertwining norms within philosophy which contribute to it: the assertion that the Adversary Method is the primary mode of argumentation and the excessive boundary policing surrounding what constitutes “real” ….

There is a significant lack of diversity in philosophy, including an underrepresentation of women and people of color, and a dearth of philosophy programs that offer classes exploring philosophy outside the Western canon. This problem is further compounded by institutional racism, sexism, and ableism within philosophy pedagogy and practice and the perception that philosophy is an abstract subject suitable only for academically advanced students. If philosophy were made more accessible to a diverse group of students before they entered college, would (...) it be possible to recruit more individuals from underrepresented groups into the field? In 2018, PLATO and the APA surveyed their members about their first exposure to philosophy. It was clear that early experiences—conversations with friends and family, books in grade school, and classes in high school—were pivotal moments that generated interest in philosophy. In this paper we describe some of these experiences and suggest that P4C programs, if done well, have the potential to help build a robust and inclusive K–12 to college philosophy pipeline by tapping into the natural interest children have in philosophical wondering. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 1 - 27 In 1617, Hugo Grotius had his treatise _On satisfaction_ published. Explicitly directed against Faustus Socinus’s 1594 book _On Jesus Christ as our Saviour_, it purports to contribute to the confutation of the Italian scholar’s teachings, which in the Netherlands were widely regarded as utterly heretical. The way in which he perceived Socinus, however, was mainly determined by the image of Socinianism as disseminated by its detractors, foremost Sibrandus Lubbertus of Franeker. (...) Grotius did read Socinus’s work, but not with much care, and at least unaccommodatingly. The reason for Grotius to intervene in this theological debate is often assumed to have been to vindicate his and his ecclesiastical party’s views on religion as orthodox, or at least far removed from Socinianism and other heresies. In contrast, it is proposed here to take the explicit motivation in the preface at face value, and assume that Grotius wrote it to refute Socinus on the basis of his juridical, philological, and historical errors, simply because he could, and genuinely abhorred Socinianism as he had learned to understand it. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

Setting Out on the Great Way: Essays on Early Mahayana Buddhism, edited by Paul Harrison. Equinox Publications, 2018. 320pp. Hb. £75.00, Pb/eBook. £26.99. ISBN-13: Hb. 9781781790960, Pb. 9781781798539, eBook 9781781796856.

The Local Computation Framework has been used to improve the efficiency of computation in various uncertainty formalisms. This paper shows how the framework can be used for the computation of logical deduction in two different ways; the first way involves embedding model structures in the framework; the second, and more direct, way involves embedding sets of formulae. This work can be applied to many of the logics developed for different kinds of reasoning, including predicate calculus, modal logics, possibilistic logics, probabilistic (...) logics and non-monotonic logics. (shrink)

Although its use is not universal, there is a map of the logical space of theories of truth that is widely applied. According to this map, the most foundational divide amongst theories of truth is that between deflationary and inflationary theories, where, roughly, the former hold that truth is an insubstantial, logical property of little philosophical interest and the latter that it is a substantial property suitable for philosophical attention. Amongst the inflationary theories, there are other fundamental divisions. For example, (...) on the one hand, correspondence theorists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of the proposition’s standing in a relation to something else which is not a proposition, such as a fact. On the other hand, coherence theorists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of its relations to other propositions. And again, pragmatists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of its being useful to believe. Throughout the twentieth century, philosophers used one or other version of this map to orient themselves and their students in the often complex and confusing debates about truth, even while acknowledging that the map may be incomplete in crucial respects (it does not include functionalist and pluralist views, for example). Our objection to the map is not that it is incomplete—although it obviously is—, but that it needs to be radically redrawn. In particular, the familiar division between coherence theories and correspondence theories needs to be rethought. The coherence theory is so often glibly dismissed as absurd that labelling someone as a coherence theorist is often seen as reason enough to ignore them.1 While none of the philosophers usually so labelled should be ignored, we shall argue (§3) that none of them actually held this view anyway. The difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of finding a genuine coherence theorist of truth strikes us as more than just an indication that this is a rare animal. Rather, it suggests the possibility of something significant, namely, that the only occupant of this position in historical space is a set of slogans; this would give us some reason to suppose that the logical space of theories is just as empty at this point.. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 735-738, December 2011.

In a famous footnote in Naming and Necessity, Kripke offered “something like a proof” of the thesis that material things have their material origins essentially (EMO). Although the sketch of a proof Kripke gave was incomplete in important respects, many philosophers have since endeavoured to develop Kripke’s style of argument so that it reaches its intended conclusion.1 In particular, a number of philosophers have attempted to complete Kripke’s argument sketch by appealing to some sort of “sufficiency principle” – a principle (...) that gives sufficient conditions for the identity of objects across possible worlds. These developments of Kripke’s argument face a number of problems, as pointed out by Mackie (1987, 2002), Robertson (1998, 2000) and others.2 Recently, however, Rohrbaugh and deRosset (2004, 2006) have offered a new route to origin essentialism that develops a Kripke-style argument without appeal to a sufficiency principle. While this argument has also not escaped criticism3, the argument suffers from a crucial flaw which has not been noticed. More interesting, though, is that the problem the argument faces is the same problem facing the arguments that appeal to sufficiency principles, and indeed Kripke’s original “proof” – all these arguments over-generalize. This strongly suggests that there is no Kripkestyle route to origin essentialism. (shrink)

The most important contemporary debate in the theory of truth is that between inflationists and deflationists.1 But although the debate is of fundamental importance, we do not have a clear, unproblematic formulation of the difference between the two camps. Part of the reason for this is that contemporary deflationists have given up many of the distinctive positions that their predecessors endorsed: typically, they no longer claim that the truth predicate is redundant, that there is no property of truth, or that (...) ‘true’ is not a predicate.2 While the desire to eschew these claims is understandable, doing so has made it more difficult to identify any difference between deflationists and inflationists, and the debate, particularly between deflationists and correspondence theorists, sometimes appears to evaporate. Perhaps in response to this worry, contemporary deflationists have adopted a range of new and distinctive deflationary claims about truth. Yet, as a number of critics have pointed out, many of these new positions are equally as implausible as those of earlier deflationists. (shrink)